

A year ago I made an innocent comment to Mr. McCarthy to the effect that there was some loose thinking among some of us about services of common concern. The penalty of that careless remark is now being visited not only on me but on you. The moral is, I presume, that he who opens his mouth should beware lest he get his feet on the platform.

In preparation for my penalty I followed the advice which I heard recently at a civic meeting in my community. An excited young chap, full of his subject and moved to make a speech, paced back and forth in front of the group and urged them to leave no stone unturned. I have at least turned over a lot of stones, but in the last moments have worried lest I hand you the stones instead of what I thought I found under them.

Before assaulting my text, which is the fourth responsibility of the DCI and CIA, I want to congratulate you, Col. Baird and the training office for providing these orientation conferences. At a minimum they seem to me to challenge both speaker and pupil to take stock of why we're here, where we've been and what's ahead. This involves the examination of our responsibilities which are probably as important but not always as clear as we like to think.

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1. The architects of the Act: the single agency versus the multiple agencies
 - a. they existed
 - b. they are needed
2. The need was for a System, Leadership and a framework for evolution.
3. That part of the legal text which provides this framework is the fourth of the Director's responsibilities: To perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
4. This phrase will bear examination:
 - a. It is not a legal phrase -- or a phrase of art
 - b. No common law or statutory precedent prior to Act of 1947
 - c. Its subtleties lie in administrative sense--the functions of intelligence organizations, their relationship.
 - d. It implies that the service is directed toward intelligence--not policy or operations--thus suggests support activities such as collection and handling of raw information and until recently has been mainly so interpreted, judging from services established. Two caveats here:

(1) The fact that the NSC directs indicates the

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its policies--in the field of economics we are in the research field.

(2) It implies that more than one intelligence organization is affected--thus of common interest

5. How does an intelligence activity get to be a service of common concern?

- a. Wishing does not make it so--though thinking helps--our sense of the system, our attitudes help.
- b. It is not created by striking a rock with a rod or by a flash of high level lightning--though this we may sometimes desire.
- c. Rather it is the result of long and tortuous (and sometimes torturous) negotiation which rests on extensive experience, administrative and cooperative.
- d. It has been agreed to by the IAC
- e. It has been approved by the NSC
- f. Then it is directed. Of the 16 NSCID's, 8 bear on our subject and they account for an extensive part of the CIA organization.

STATSPEC




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STATSPEC



7.

25X1C

- a. Detailed NSCID and why
- b. State suggestion for investigation -- 1946
- c. 
- d. The committee -- means of advice

25X1C


25X1B

- e. The license--Navy and 

25X1C

8.



- a. Only directive which refers to paragraph 4 of the Act
- b. Primary not exclusive
- c.  25X1B
- d. Army's file -- extensive - discontinue - file turned over -
Wright field - yet but cooperation

9. Clandestine

- a. Not preclusive. Recognizes need of a theater for
operational purposes
- b. Problem of agreed activities
- c. IAC subcommittee for guidance

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10. [REDACTED]

a. [REDACTED]

25X1C

11. Economics

Economic intelligence under the system created by law and amplified by the third Directive is produced by each agency according to its need. Because of the disparate character of the governmental efforts in economic intelligence, the National Security Council two years ago requested that a survey be made of these resources requesting recommendations with regard thereto. The resulting Directive, No. 15, directs the Agency to produce, as a service of common concern, ~~xxxx~~ foreign economic intelligence not provided by other agencies in their discharge of regular departmental missions and assigned intelligence responsibilities, and to fulfill requests of the IAC. This directive ^{adequately} may not provide for an integrated approach to economic intelligence in the community. At least more needs to be accomplished toward this goal. In addition, CIA is to review requirements for such economic intelligence as relates to the national security, develop regular procedures to see that the full economic knowledge and technical talent in the government is brought to bear on important issues involving national security, and identify gaps in foreign economic data. The DCI, with the concurrence of the IAC, established the Economic

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Intelligence Committee to assist in accomplishing these objectives.

The hard core of the functions of CIA thus are seen to be services of common concern, as defined by the NSC in pursuance of paragraph 4, which authorizes the establishment of services of common concern when it is clear they can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

12. Handling of Foreign Language Materials

- a. In development for five years--importance of post mortem on China
- b. Other agencies not excluded from activity
- c. The Advisory Committee as a condition as well as an assistance

A common fallacy in our thinking--that a service of common concern must be total and exclusive--not true in fact--not wise in theory--not practicable in all cases. This flexibility is trying to many of us who look for clear and undiluted authority, free of the impediments of relations with our friends. We cannot escape it, for the architects of the Act of 1947 intended a system, and our successive and successful leaders have built a system.

Conclusion:

At the outset, I theorized that the drafters of the National Security Act could have solved the government's intelligence problem

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by creating a single intelligence agency to meet all the needs of the

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government. That they did not is clear from the Act, and why they did not is, I trust, evident from what I have been ~~saying~~ saying.

They did, however, create a new agency, and they gave it the deceptive name "CENTRAL Intelligence Agency." This is a deceptive name because this Agency is central only in that it is the center of an interrelated system of interdependent intelligence agencies. Its Director is responsible for providing leadership to the community. It is also "central" in one other sense, namely: insofar as it performs services of common concern, about which I trust we now know more. A wider understanding of this limited character of CIA's "centrality" could do much to limit our own disappointment that we do not do more and our friends' possible concern that we do too much.

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In general terms, why have our services of common concern come to be:

- a. Others did not want to bother with them--marginal-- though not dispensable--and obviously part of a balanced system.
- b. They could not--money in the long pull
- c. Obvious but useless competition among departmental services and dangers to security
- d. Obvious advantage of central and reliable dissemination to all
- e. CIA has so conducted its own internal support functions as to explore how to be most useful to the community of ~~the~~ intelligence.
- f. The other agencies have gained confidence in our purpose and ability

It is necessary at about this time to mention a counterweight to our imagination and zeal in seeking out new services of common concern.

By the first directive the purposes ~~x~~ of such coordination for which the Act was drawn should be primarily to strengthen the over-all governmental structure and that primary departmental requirements should be recognized and receive the cooperation and support of CIA.

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The injunction is clearly not to just tolerate--but to support.

Some of our activities which serve the community but are not services of common concern:

- a. The industrial register
- b. The graphic register
- c. Sovmat
- d. [REDACTED] collection and analysis
- e. OSI

25X1C

Why aren't they? They have not been designated by the NSC.

Then what is their status--how are they recognized by the community?

// Go back over the list/